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Abstract
This chapter provides a theoretical and conceptual overview of the governance 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR). It is based on an extensive review of 
corporate governance literature, specifically on the composition of boards and 
committees and how they influence corporate outcomes. The attributes of com-
mittees’ members could play a key role in the definition of a CSR strategy and its 
implementation. The second section analyzes how diversity in boardrooms and CSR 
committees could foster CSR performance, through specific dimensions of social 
performance. It focuses on the influence of structural and demographic diversities 
in boardrooms on CSR performance and the role of CSR committees on the imple-
mentation of a strategic CSR-building process. The third section identifies CSR 
strategies: (1) strategic CSR driven by initiatives and pioneering actions and (2) 
responsive CSR based on the imitation of the main competitors and the implemen-
tation of basic actions to “avoid” stakeholders’ pressure. We point out that strategic 
CSR has been widely discussed and extended while responsive CSR is marginalized 
and often associated with low social performance. This dichotomous approach of 
CSR strategies could be biased. Many firms could display a strategic CSR in some 
areas and a responsive CSR in other areas. The role of CSR committees and their 
composition are discussed in section (4). The last section concludes the paper.
Keywords: social performance, corporate governance, diversity, strategic CSR,  
CSR committee
1. Introduction
In the last years, diversity on top management positions, particularly on boards 
has attracted an increasing interest [1–6]. It is widely argued that board diversity 
has effects on many business areas, such as financial performance, governance 
quality, innovation, and risk preferences [3, 7–10].
In fact, diversity could lead to meaningful changes in leadership style, generate 
new ideas, and challenge the business management, through specific channels such 
as the traits of top managers and executives. In fact, many studies on board diver-
sity conclude that independent, female and foreign directors, directors who belong 
to minorities and those with specific academic and professional backgrounds could 
have significant effects on the business’ outcomes.
The literature on board diversity distinguishes two different types of diversity: 
(1) diversity in boards that refers to the heterogeneity of directors’ profiles, more 
specifically demographic traits such as age, gender, nationality, and (2) diversity 
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of boards that is explained by structural features, like for example the board size, 
CEO-chair structure, duality, and independence [2, 11, 12].
Most often, diversity has been discussed in the light of the competitive advan-
tage, it could provide to the business in the short term as well as the long term 
[12–14]. Lately, more papers have stated that getting more diverse top management 
is an ethical requirement to go beyond the restrictive financial view, mainly focused 
on short-term returns [9, 11]. In fact Béji et al. [2] provide evidence that all diver-
sity forms are valuable to improve corporate social responsibility CSR at different 
levels. Increasing social performance could drive a more sustainable financial 
performance.
Taking into account cognitive and psychological features in top management 
positions could shape the decision-making process. Indeed, directors’ ideas 
and choices are influenced by their individuals’ beliefs and values [15]. On the 
same vein, the adoption of CSR practices, specifically on the absence of manda-
tory CSR standards, is the result of stakeholders’ pressure as well as personal 
beliefs [16].
In fact, there are two different approaches in CSR practices. According to [17–19], 
CSR could be: (1) strategic when the firm displays a high level of CSR commitment 
going beyond standards and stakeholders’ expectations, and (2) responsive when 
CSR actions are mainly determined by external expectations and reporting stan-
dards. Most often, responsive CSR corresponds to the lowest level of commitment.
In fact, in line with dependence resource theory, getting involved in more 
inclusive nomination policies helps the company to get access to new opportunities 
through a better understanding of the market expectations and the deployment of 
more resources [9]. Also, previous studies put forward that, in high uncertainty 
contexts, diverse teams are more successful [20, 21].
In order to develop their CSR strategies, many firms have decided to establish 
specialized board committees, namely CSR committees CSRC [22, 23]; CSRCs aim 
to guide the company towards more strategic CSR actions, through the implementa-
tion of CSR initiatives, decreasing CSR risks and pursuing new opportunities [24]. 
They play a key role in the development of a CSR strategy and improving social 
performance [25]. They also have to check the compliance with regulations and 
initiatives in order to decrease CSR risks [22, 26].
Not surprisingly, corporate governance literature shows that the composition 
of CSRC influences corporate outcomes [27–29]. The attributes of CSRC members 
could, therefore, matter in the definition of a CSR strategy and its implementation.
This chapter provides a theoretical and conceptual overview of the governance 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR). It is based on an extensive review of 
corporate governance literature, specifically on the composition of boards and 
committees and how they influence corporate outcomes [27–29]. The attributes 
of committees’ members could play a key role in the definition of a CSR strategy 
and its implementation. The second section analyzes how diversity in boardrooms 
and CSR committees could foster CSR performance, through specific dimensions 
of social performance. It focuses on the influence of structural and demographic 
diversities in boardrooms on CSR performance and the role of CSR committees on 
the implementation of a strategic CSR-building process.
The third section identifies CSR strategies: (1) strategic CSR driven by initia-
tives and pioneering actions and (2) responsive CSR based on the imitation of the 
main competitors and the implementation of basic actions to “avoid” stakeholders’ 
pressure. We point out that strategic CSR has been widely discussed and extended 
while responsive CSR is marginalized and often associated with low social perfor-
mance. This dichotomous approach of CSR strategies could be biased. Many firms 
could display a strategic CSR in some areas and a responsive CSR in other areas. The 
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role of CSR committees and their composition are discussed in section (4). The last 
section concludes the chapter.
2. Does board diversity favor CSR?
Under the upper echelon’s theory [30], in diverse boards directors have more 
and different characteristics. They have, therefore, more knowledge, skills, values, 
and professional experiences that generate more ideas and interpretations of the 
situations they face. Diversity could lead to superior monitoring, and thus, more 
strategic involvement in CSR [3, 31, 32].
From an agency perspective [31], board members are supposed to monitor top 
managers to ensure that they serve shareholders’ interests. The board’s effective-
ness is closely related to its composition [33, 34]. For instance, increasing corporate 
transparency improves the decision-making process, which drives more socially 
responsible management.
Resource dependence theory [35] also supports diversity in boards. Appointing 
more diverse profiles to boardrooms allows the firms to get access to more diverse 
resources, in terms of experiences, skills and networks [36–38]. All these resources 
are valuable when the firm has to meet shareholders expectations, and therefore for 
the development of a CSR strategy [5, 8, 39, 40].
2.1 Structural diversity in boards and CSR
Structural diversity refers to diversity of boards. In fact, boards display different 
features in terms of structure, size, the separation between management and control 
functions as well as the percentage of independent members [3, 6].
First, the board size is a key determinant of the board effectiveness. Regarding 
social performance, studies provide mixed results. On the one hand, large boards 
may be associated with more resources and knowledge, very valuable to improve the 
decision-making process [41–43]. Appointing more diverse profiles to boardrooms 
increases the firm’s social capital [35, 44, 45] and leads to a more balanced decision-
making. They can therefore increase the firm’s involvement in socially responsible 
activities, and social performance [2, 41]. Neo-institutional and stakeholder theo-
ries state that large boards are representative of diverse interests [44, 46]. Also, from 
a dependency theory perspective, large boards have better information and more 
specific knowledge [9, 43]. From an ecological view, De Villiers et al. [47] argue that 
large boards are likely to have members with environmental knowledge, who may 
influence board’s decisions on environmental issues. Their findings show a positive 
impact of board size on environmental performance. Accordingly, more oriented 
advice on strategic decisions could be provided by large boards [18, 48–50].
On the other hand, the agency theory holds that large boards could suffer com-
munication and coordination problems which slower the decision-making process, 
specifically when directors have very different backgrounds [51, 52] and diversity is 
low in top management positions. For instance, CEOs are more powerful and influ-
ential over small boards than large ones: it becomes easier to reach a consensus [51].
Second, duality is another form of diversity of boards. According to Surroca 
and Tribo [53], duality leads to a concentration of management and control func-
tions. When the CEO is also the chairperson, there is a concentration of power that 
does not benefit CSR investments [53, 54]. For instance, CEO-chair may pursue 
opportunistic strategies to have more private benefits in the short term, at the 
expense of long-term and less profitable activities such as CSR ones [54, 55]. In 
fact, Entrenched CEOs are prone to adopt opportunistic strategies to protect their 
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interests at the expense of shareholders. Accordingly, they could marginalize value 
enhancing projects, specifically low profitable and long-term projects such as CSR 
and innovation projects. Under the pressure of shareholders looking for immediate 
returns, CEOs are likely to undertake profitable and less sustainable projects. In this 
sense, De Villiers et al. highlight that “If the CEO is faced with a compelling motive 
for maximizing short-term financial gains at the expense of strategic investments 
in environmental opportunities, the presence of a dual CEO-chair will reduce the 
likelihood of the board approving immediate investments in environmental oppor-
tunities with long payback periods” ([42], p. 1642).
Furthermore, the duality structure could also limit the board effectiveness, 
specifically in terms of control and monitoring [56] and could decrease transpar-
ency and the governance quality which does not improve CSR performance [42].
Finally, the presence of independent directors has been widely discussed [57]. 
Independent directors are prone to reduce agency conflicts and to ensure effective 
monitoring and therefore better management quality. For Adams and Ferreira 
[58], their presence solves attendance problems on the board. Independent direc-
tors provide better management advice [34, 57]. From an agency perspective, it is 
widely known that they decrease opportunistic behavior of managers who could be 
tempted to extract some private benefits, specifically under asymmetric information 
[58–60]. To better serve the stakeholders’ interests, they may ask for more details 
to be disclosed in annual reports [61]. However studies on the association between 
board independence and CSR disclosure do not provide conclusive results. Some 
studies [62–64] provide evidence that independent members are prone to increase 
disclosure. Prado-Lorenzo and Garcia-Sanchez [65] and Lim et al. [66]identify a 
negative influence, while other studies find non-significant association [67].
Independent board members are likely to support investment decisions that 
respond to stakeholders needs [2, 34]. On the same vein, [58] show that their 
presence improves board functioning, particularly attendance problems on board 
meetings. The results of previous studies show that independent directors have a 
significant positive effect on CSR performance [68–71].
However, when we focus on specific dimensions of CSR such as the governance 
quality, the quality of the work environment, the protection of human rights, the 
involvement in local activities and ethical activities, they seem to have influential 
effects only on specific areas. For instance, Béji et al. [2] show that board indepen-
dence has a positive effect only the governance quality. Their result is in line with a 
large number of studies highlighting the positive influence of independent directors 
on the quality of corporate governance [72–75]. One explanation is that indepen-
dent directors provide strong incentives to align internal expectations and firm 
objectives through good governance practices [74, 75].
Regarding environmental performance, De Villiers et al. [42] provide evidence 
that boards with more independent directors are more likely to have more informa-
tion and knowledge of monitoring environmental performance. Precisely, environ-
mental strengths are positively and significantly related to director independence.
These different results are mainly explained by the different proxies used to 
assess the social performance and the sample considered by the study. For instance 
Beji et al. [2] is drawn on a European sample, namely French listed companies and 
Vigeo Eiris scores while De Villiers et al. [42] relies on MSCI-KLD scores.
2.2 Demographic diversity in board and social performance
Demographic diversity is a form of diversity inside boardrooms. The profile 
of board members has changed in the last years, because of a social pressure: the 
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boards are expected to appoint more diverse profiles in the image of the society they 
produce. Consequently, gender, foreign, and generational diversities have attracted 
an increasing interest.
Many studies put forward that female directors are likely to increase CSR per-
formance at different levels [2, 5, 6, 9, 76]. In fact, gender diverse boards have better 
social performance than less diverse ones [9]; In fact, women members seem to be 
more concerned about governance, environmental and social issues [21, 77–81]. 
They could be tempted to undertake non-profit activities (The social identity 
theory, [82]). In line with the social role theory [83, 84], women are prone to be 
altruistic and to care about relationships [85]. In fact, previous studies point out 
that women have higher cognitive moral reasoning scores and more ethical percep-
tions than men [86–88]. From the upper echelons’ theory perspective [30], women 
display specific cognitive features. They bring their differences to boardrooms that 
have been male-controlled places for long time [89, 90].
Specifically, Elstad and Ladegard [91] point out that female directors could 
change the decision-making dynamics inside boardrooms. In line with the depen-
dence resource theory, women have different experiences and qualifications from 
their male counterparts, they could, therefore have different values and analysis 
perspectives. This leads to more interactive dynamics in boardrooms [92]. They 
have most often more connections to external sources, which make them, wanted 
in boards and on specific board’s committees, such as audit, governance, ethics and 
environment committees [58, 93] . They also have different academic and profes-
sional backgrounds which give access to more resources and specific networks (the 
resource dependence theory, [35]). These resources are valuable when it comes to 
the implementation of CSR projects [77–79, 94].
Also, there is a large consensus that women are less risk averse than their male 
counterparts [85]. Many studies have put forward differences between men and 
women in terms of skills, competences, networks and risk-preferences (see among 
others [95–97], [98]), p. 64. For instance, Torchia et al. [99], Diaz-Garcia et al. 
[100], and Kang et al. argue that women have better and specific knowledge of 
customers. They could bring new perspectives and ideas that could lead to the 
introduction of new products and processes [101]. Furthermore, appointing women 
to director’s positions could improve the communication and the interaction inside 
R&D teams, without taking excessive risks: [96–98], provide evidence that women 
are more risk-averse than men. All these features could lead the reader to think that 
women directors are prone to be more concerned about CSR and to recommend 
more socially responsible actions.
However, taking into account female and male attributes such as the age, and the 
academic and professional experiences show non conclusive evidence on whether 
women on corporate boards increase the propensity to take risky decisions or favor 
risk-avoidance (see among others [95, 98, 102]).
Also, many studies conclude that women display a lack of industry experience, 
concentrate on less profitable activities [103, 104]. One explanation could be the 
small number of women on top management positions and boardrooms because of 
the glass ceiling barrier (glass ceiling theory, Morrison et al. [105]). The glass ceiling 
was identified in the 1980s by the International Labor Organization and Catalyst4. 
The glass ceiling theory is about “those artificial barriers based on an attitudinal or 
organizational bias that prevents qualified individuals from advancing upward into 
management level positions” (ILO, 2001): women cannot easily achieve top manage-
ment positions because of the lack of mentoring and effective networks. Social and 
cultural barriers, such as the work-life balance that women have to preserve, could 
stop them when they want to get access to leadership. Gender quota laws have been 
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introduced in several countries (Norway, France, Spain, etc.) to increase women 
presence on board. However, female directors are still prevented from moving 
up into management and leadership positions and are facing significant barriers. 
Indeed, women are not appointed to strategic and advising positions in the board 
such as CSR, development and remuneration committees. Most often, they are 
members of monitoring committees such as governance, audit and risk commit-
tees, particularly in male-dominated companies [106]. In fact, women are still not 
involved, in an effective way to influence the decision-making process. They face a 
new glass-barrier in boardrooms: the glass cliff barrier [107–109]. Despite, the fact 
that women are selected to sit in monitoring committees; they are likely decrease 
CEO salaries, bonuses and total compensation [110] which increases transparency.
Yet, many papers have discussed the costs and benefits of regulation dedicated to 
increase women representation in top management levels [111, 112]. Pro and anti-
regulation arguments make the debate on the efficiency of gender quota law very 
intense, specifically should be considered specific governance and social features. 
For instance, highly qualified women who are able to sit on boards suffer from lack 
of visibility because of weak networking and social circles. As a consequence, firms 
make-believe that they have a limited pool of female talents. Hence, social ties and 
contacts are critical to the appointment of women to director’s positions. This could 
increase the risk of recruiting unqualified female directors [113].
Generational diversity is also a requirement for social performance [2, 6, 114]. 
Age could be a proxy for the directors’ wisdom in managing the business, their 
experience and their openness to new ideas [6, 115]. According to Ouma et al. 
[115], successful business management relies on more age-balanced organiza-
tions, specifically in top management positions. Besides, age diversity could help 
to solve “narrow group thinking” problems and be associated with a specific level 
of knowledge and openness to new ideas [114, 115]. When they mature, directors 
could become more sensitive to society’s needs: they get involved in a giving-back 
to society process [6, 116]. Thus, old directors are likely to improve social perfor-
mance. Regarding detailed dimensions of CSR, Ferrero et al. [117] argue that age 
diversity leads to a more balanced decision-making which enhances corporate 
performance while Béji et al. [2] find that they have significant effects in numer-
ous CSR areas, specifically the quality of the work environment, the protection 
of environment and human rights as well as the governance quality. However, we 
should highlight that Béji et al. [2] results provide evidence that old directors are 
prone to display higher moral reasoning in France, not only because of getting more 
experience and wisdom but also in response to several specific programs, such as 
Grenelle II Law in 2011, dedicated to increase the firm’s involvement in CSR activi-
ties. Furthermore, the Copé-Zimmermann law,1 commonly known as the French 
gender quota law, introduced in 2009 and implemented in 2011 has increased 
dramatically the presence of women on boardrooms. It applies to listed firms and 
firms with on average more than 500 fulltime employees for three successive years 
or with a yearly turnover (or a total assets) of at least 50 million euros. This law has 
short and long term effects. In the short term (by the end of 2012), all non-gender 
diverse boards, namely male controlled ones, have to appoint a director of the oppo-
site gender. In the long term, non-gender balanced boards have to achieve at least 
20% directors of the under-represented in 2014 and at least 40% in 2017. If the firm 
is non-compliant, there are penalties. Specifically, new member appointments that 
are not binding the law must be considered null. However, the decisions voted by 
the non-compliant boards, are not canceled. The two laws have boosted the social 
performance of companies through different channels: because of the limited pool 
1 https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000023487662&categorieLien=id
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of female candidates, firms appointed younger women to their boards to comply 
with the gender quota law, which have influenced the board structure and therefore 
governance quality. Grenelle II law put pressure on listed firms to raise more money 
on socially responsible projects.
We should also notice that there have been many changes in universities cur-
ricula in the last years. Management and business programs, on particular, have 
introduced specific sessions and courses on sustainable development and CSR. This 
means that new graduated candidates are aware of the importance to align social 
and financial performances and consider financial as well as environmental and 
social risks. Accordingly, young directors could also be sensitive to CSR activities 
and concerned about environmental and ethical issues [6]. For instance, [80] pro-
vide evidence that young members are sensitive to environmental and ethical issues.
Another interesting feature of board diversity is the presence of foreign mem-
bers [2, 6, 118]. The appointment of foreign directors responds to the business 
needs of globalization [119]. The empirical investigation shows that nationality 
diversity enhances the firm involvement in philanthropic and local social activities 
[120]. Lau et al. [121] find that the presence of foreign directors on the board has 
a positive relationship with CSR, they put forward that foreign nationality brings 
a positive energy for directors to follow socially responsible activities. Their inter-
national expertise, broader and diversified networks, awareness of environmental 
and social issues and willingness to use new technologies are value-enhancing in 
terms of social performance [2, 118, 120]. Non-local directors bring their cultural 
values and new connections to the business, specifically on environmental projects 
[2, 6, 122]. Also, foreign directors allow the company to have access diversified and 
international expertise and increases exposure to cultural diversity [118]. They are 
likely to focus on environmental management and to prefer technologies producing 
less waste and less pollution [123]. In fact, Christmann et al. [124] provide evidence 
that they have access to environmental management information, particularly 
international environmental requirements and opportunities. Besides, using a 
sample of U.S. firms, Harjoto et al. [125] find that having greater board nationality 
diversity could improve firms’ social performance by decreasing individual biases 
and prejudices. In addition to their positive influence on environmental issues, Béji 
et al. [2] show that they increase the firm’s interaction with local communities [126].
Different educational backgrounds are also a valuable form of diversity in 
boardrooms [127–129]. Many studies show that post-graduated directors are 
positively associated with the firm’s success [30, 130]. High-educated members 
have better capacity to absorb new ideas and adopt new challenging tendencies. 
They also can adjust quickly their strategies and decision-making process to 
comply with new regulations and sudden events [128, 131, 132]. Rupley et al. [127, 
133]; Goll and Rasheed [128]; Hillman and Dalziel [129]; Hambrick and Mason 
[34] provide evidence that business-graduated directors could influence firm 
performance and strategies. In terms of CSR, they are likely to be more sensitive to 
environmental issues [35, 135]. Their international skills and experiences are valu-
able to understand environmentalists’ needs. For instance, Gadenne et al. [136] 
and Vives [137] show that post graduated directors are able to generate a greater 
level of commitment to CSR activities. Also, Shahgholian [138] put forward that 
highly-educated directors are more likely to have knowledge of environmental 
issues, which may help the board to develop environmental activities. Regarding 
education’s type, Sleeper et al. [139] find a positive relationship between CSR 
and business education. In the same vein, Panapanaan et al. [140] argue that 
business-educated members have higher sensitivity towards ethics, CSR, sustain-
ability and, consequently, prefer ethical projects. Unlike previous studies, Béji et 
al. [2] find no significant association between management-graduated directors 
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and the CSR global performance. Surprisingly, they are prone to be less sensitive 
to environmental and ethical issues and more concerned about the governance 
quality. In fact, these divergent results could be explained by the fact that most of 
board members in Béji et al. [2] sample are middle-aged (55 years old on average) 
and had attended business and management programs in their earlier life focused 
on financial performance: the concept of social performance has been recently 
introduced in the universities’ curricula. They have, therefore, the required 
qualifications to increase profitability and handle risks, in other words on how to 
serve the shareholders’ interests. Furthermore, they are prone to prefer short-term 
projects with immediate returns at the expense of risky, less profitable and long-
term projects, such as CSR ones [141].
Finally, sitting on multiple boards is a proxy for the busyness of the board 
members. Board busyness could influence the firm involvement in CSR activities 
[2, 127, 142]. Some studies have focused on the link between multiple directorships, 
CSR disclosure, and firm environmental performance. Multiple directorships could 
have a positive effect on voluntary environmental disclosure [127], and help the 
company to adopt policies of other companies. They could also bring to the board 
information about unfamiliar practices to the firm [129].
In terms of firms’ environmental performance, a large number of studies argue 
that directors who are sitting on multiple boards can gain access to more informa-
tion about environmental initiatives and find out more about other firms’ environ-
mental activities [86, 142]. On the same vein, many studies put forward a positive 
association between multiple directorships and the involvement in proactive envi-
ronmental strategies [42, 100, 142]. Focusing on specific CSR dimensions shows 
that directors’ busyness significantly improves the quality of work environment, 
the awareness of environmental issues and the involvement in ethical activities [2].
It is straightforward to see that readjusting the board composition could be valu-
able to induce changes that enhance social performance. In fact, firms looking for 
sustainable development cannot ignore stakeholders’ expectations and have to act 
responsibly [143, 144]. Getting involved in socially responsible activities could be 
challenging and provide new opportunities to create value, differently. Accordingly, 
many firms have decided to establish specialized committees (CSR committees 
CSRC) to go beyond elementary and responsive CSR practices and to achieve more 
sustainable and strategic ones [145, 146].
In the following, we discuss the features of CSRC and how they could lead to best-
integrated CSR models and to meet, therefore, the plurality of existing demands.
3. CSR strategies
Many theories have been actively applied in the field of CSR, such as the theories 
of stakeholders’ theory [147], resource-based view [148], market-based view [149, 
150], branding strategy [151, 152], strategic conversations [153], public-private 
partnerships [154], and emergent strategy [155] to understand CSR strategies.
While it is assumed that firms act socially responsible because they anticipate 
some benefits, theories of CSR assert that firms engage in profit-maximizing CSR, 
being their principal motivation [156, 157]. This leads to the identification of 
diverse CSR strategies.
CSR strategies could be divided into two categories: (1) strategic CSR associ-
ated to high level of commitment and implies a more comprehensive implementa-
tion of CSR within a firm and (2) responsive CSR that is mainly determined by 
external expectations and reporting standards, and corresponds to the lowest level 
of commitment [17–19].
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3.1 Strategic versus responsive CSR
Many studies have tried to establish criterion to distinguish between the two 
CSR strategies. During the last years, the concept of strategic CSR has been widely 
discussed and extended while responsive CSR is still marginalized and often 
associated with low social performances. In fact, the current literature on CSR has 
adopted a biased and dichotomous view of CSR strategies: firms could adopt either 
a strategic CSR or a responsive CSR. However, firms could display a strategic CSR in 
some areas and a responsive CSR in other areas.
Indeed, social performance is a multidimensional concept that touches many 
areas in the business. Despite that fact that CSR rating, such as MSCI-KLD social 
index2 and VigeoEiris3 scores are based on different methodologies to calculate the 
global social score, they examine specific areas in the business such as the gover-
nance quality, the degree of involvement in ethical activities, the interaction with 
local communities, the actions put on place to treat environmental issues, and the 
quality of the work environment (see Table 1, for a detailed example).
The strategic side of CSR seems to be a promising and relevant field for further 
research [157]. However, the lack of consideration of the strategic aspects of CSR, 
and the scarcity of theoretical and empirical research on the determinants of strate-
gic CSR [157] led several scholars to call for identifying the determinants of strate-
gic CSR [158, 159]. While CSR tends to assume an increasingly strategic integration, 
very few studies analyze why organizations report different levels of strategic CSR. 
Thus, there is a need to deepen knowledge on the drivers and rationale of CSR 
behavior, and the conditions favoring strategic CSR integration.
Regarding the definition of strategic CSR, CSR becomes strategic in a company 
when social and environmental issues become a high priority, and diverse means 
and practices are mobilized to handle them [160]. Accordingly, CSR is strategic 
“when it yields substantial business-related benefits to the firm, in particular by 
supporting core business activities and thus contributing to the firm’s effectiveness 
in accomplishing its mission”. Then, the concept was developed to cover actions 
put into practice to achieve sustainable competitive advantages. Strategic CSR is, 
therefore, a set of activities that are simultaneously good for the company and the 
society, thus improving company’s performance and creating social and economic 
performances [161–163]. Recently, studies have become more specific regarding the 
definition of strategic CSR. Strategic CSR is defined as a continuous process that 
takes into account its effect, helps the company to pursue its business goals while 
considering the stakeholders’ engagement [164]. It related CSR to the corporate 
core business, auditing, setting of social targets, reporting, and implementation of 
social management systems [165]. CSR is strategic when it increasingly goes beyond 
the basic needs of a company’s stakeholders [166]. They also argue that the assump-
tion of a strategic perspective implies not only the definition of the business’ future 
direction and objectives but also an understanding of the amount and apportion-
ment of available resources. Sufficient resources allow the firm to develop strate-
gies suitable for pursuing opportunities coherent with its current and prospective 
environment and capacities. Thus, resources have to be strategically invested and 
allocated in order to enhance CSR performance.
Since the nineties, many studies tried to provide relevant theoretical frameworks 
to identify the differences between CSR strategies, particularly between responsive 


















Social dialog Environmental strategy Product safety Board of directors Local social and economic 
development
Fundamental rights
Employee participation Pollution prevention and 
control
Information to customers Audit and internal 
controls





Green products and 
services
Responsible customer relations Shareholders Philanthropic contributions Nondiscrimination and 
diversity








Water Supply chain management 
(environmental standards)










Impacts of product use 
and disposal
Table 1. 
A brief summary of VigeoEiris CSR scores.
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First, Hart [167], inspired by the resource based view theory, identified three 
interconnected strategies based on the product stewardship, pollution prevention and 
sustainable development; where the latter aspect is a necessary requirement to inte-
grate stakeholders and ensure a good CSR planning. According to Hart, to be competi-
tive firms have to achieve sustainability and introduce more technological innovation.
Then, Burke and Logsdon [160] have founded the second framework for stra-
tegic CSR. They have been able to introduce specific dimensions to assess strategic 
strategies:
1. Centrality to assess “the closeness of fit to the firm’s mission and objectives”. 
CSR actions should be related to the business core and central activities;
2. Proactivity of programs in terms of anticipating the emerging social trends 
and crisis;
3. Voluntarism showing the firm ability to go beyond the pressure of social 
requirements and recommendations, and the urgent need to comply with 
regulation, and standards;
4. Visibility based on the firm capacity to provide observable and reliable signals to 
diverse stakeholders’ groups whether they are internal or external. It measures 
the firm involvement on a reputation building process.
5. Specificity measuring the firm ability “to capture private benefits” of undertaken 
CSR activities.
When CSR initiatives meet these features, they are more likely to generate 
economic benefits and to foster the firm financial performance.
Porter and Kramer [168–170] have introduced the third framework for strategic 
CSR that have significantly influenced the following CSR frameworks. They have 
established that strategic CSR goes beyond best practices and provides a competi-
tive advantage, while responsive CSR concerns acting as a good corporate citizen 
by simply responding to stakeholders’ demands. In other words, when a company 
combines effectively all its attributes, resources and expertise with the competitive 
context, its CSR strategy can be considered as a pillar of its profitability and its 
competitive positioning. Thus, there is a convergence between financial and social 
performances. Accordingly, firms must be more selective in terms of CSR projects 
as strategic and responsive CSR produce varied benefits [171–174].
The final CSR framework established the widely known stakeholder theory 
[175]. It argues that CSR projects implicate different stakeholders groups and have 
to lead to the wealth creation [176, 177] . Profitable CSR strategies have to align the 
interests of these groups [178]. Lately, inspired by Burke and Logsdon [160], [179] 
have identified more specific dimensions of how to ensure the convergence of social 
and financial performances: (1) reputation enhancement, (2) stakeholder recipro-
cation, (3) risk mitigation, and (4) innovation capacity.
3.1.1 Reputation enhancement
The rise of CSR has coincided with an increasing concern for the firm market 
image [180]. Several studies show that CSR activities could be considered as a man-
agement tool to enhance reputation [181–184]. In line with the legitimacy theory 
and the signal theory, strategic CSR is supposed to improve the financial perfor-
mance through improving the business reputation [184]. In fact CSR activities 
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should visible and provide information to the existing and potential stakeholders, 
particularly in the presence of asymmetric information problems [185].
Reputation could be enhanced through the firm customers and employees. On 
the one hand, customers prefer to buy the goods and services produced by firms 
displaying large CSR scores [186], even when they have to pay higher prices [187]. 
On the other hand, employees looking for job opportunities are attracted by firms 
involved in socially responsible activities: they have the feeling to contribute the 
“legitimate” activities [188, 189].
Customers and employees behaviors have a positive influence on financial per-
formance. In fact, investments analysts provide evidence that public announcement 
of CSR initiatives provides a positive signal to investors and increases therefore 
stock prices [190–192].
3.1.2 Stakeholders reciprocation
According to the Stakeholder theory [147], taking into account the stakeholders’ 
needs brings positive effects to the business that are not visible to all stakeholders 
and investors. The reputation effect is, therefore, not systematic [156]. Freeman 
[147] argues that there are different stakeholders groups: focusing on key stakehold-
ers is able to drive cooperative, productive and sustainable interaction [193, 194]. 
For instance, setting up a fair compensation policy and a safer work environment 
provides strong incentives to motivated and productive employees to better work 
for the business [195, 196]. Furthermore, undertaking socially responsible activities 
favors higher levels of community endorsement, more favorable regulatory and 
enforcement conditions for the firm [197], and higher levels of public procure-
ment [198, 199]. Also, it could help the business to gain legitimacy in communities’ 
eyes and a societal license to operate [200, 201]. For instance, Dorobantu and 
Odziemkowska [202] point out that in mining industries, firms are prone to sign 
agreements that benefit local communities and compensate them for social and 
environmental risks they could bear.
In the absence of stakeholder reciprocity, social and environmental cost could 
deter the business profitability through specific channels such as the depreciation of 
intangible assets and increasing investors’ skepticism [200, 202].
3.1.3 Risk mitigation
If in market finance, it is obvious that a good assets’ diversification drastically 
decreases corporate risks, in CSR, interacting with more diverse stakeholders’ 
groups can reduce company-specific risks [203]. This means that businesses have 
also, to care about the expectations of non-key stakeholders, even when they are 
not tied to their core business. It is highly argued that CSR activities decrease stock 
price crash risk and firm default risk [180, 204–207]. In fact they are based on 
controlling and avoiding risk-taking mechanisms [125, 208] and designed to avoid 
harming stakeholders through pollution prevention practices and fair-trade policies 
[179, 209].
3.1.4 Innovation capacity
Despite the fact that CSR-innovation association is not yet fully explored, some 
recent papers argue that strategic CSR could provide a variety of opportunities to 
innovate [210, 211]. According to Vishwanathan et al. [179, 209], CSR activities 
increase the innovation capacity because of the development of existing innovation 
capabilities and the creation of new capabilities, necessary to the implementation of 
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CSR activities. For instance, developing closer relationship with diverse stakehold-
ers could drive valuable opportunities to respond to their needs [212–214], and to 
introduce, therefore, a sort of responsible innovations [215, 216]. These innovations 
could be driven by the interaction with key stakeholders. In socially responsible 
activities, employees’ turnover is decreased. Consequently, employees can “imagine 
their future” in the firm and have incentives to get involved in the long term busi-
ness activities.
They are likely to share information on the current issues and the ways to over-
come them with the firm, specifically with top managers [212] and could introduce 
organizational innovations. Employees’ involvement reduces short-term thinking 
and behavior, most often impeding innovation.
3.2 Why should firms establish CSR committees?
Despite the large number of studies on boardroom’s composition, many areas 
are not yet fully explored, specifically how the structure of board committees 
could shape strategic decisions in terms of innovation, and CSR. The governance 
literature concludes that committees are key determinants of the board function-
ing [217–219]. In fact, the composition and functions of committees have a strong 
influence on board’s composition as well as committee’s activities.
The literature on board committees focuses, especially, on monitoring commit-
tees, such as governance and audit committees. It analyzes how they could influence 
the quality of financial disclosure, internet reporting, earnings management, and 
financial performance [230–225]. Most of these papers have explored the effect of 
appointing independent members in committees [224, 226–229].
However, in order to deal with the wide range of board’s functions and for a bet-
ter understanding of stakeholder expectations, many companies have established 
CSR committees [230]. In France, 37% of firms listed on the SBF120 index4 have 
created advising committee dedicated to CSR. The creation of CSRCs is meant to 
respond to stakeholder theory statements: it implies the creation of governance 
bodies that are able to fulfill stakeholders’ needs [231]. CSRCs have a strategic role 
to play in achieving corporate legitimacy and strategy formulation, and in imple-
menting firms’ CSR initiatives [22, 23, 232–234].
Previous studies have discussed how CSRCs could improve the governance 
quality [61, 235] and ESG disclosure [69]. Also, they help to solve agency con-
flicts through the alignment of diverse interests (managers, shareholders and 
stakeholders).
Regarding social performance, empirical studies conclude that they are posi-
tively associated with environmental performance [26, 236] as well as CSR perfor-
mance [33, 236–238].
Besides, they are created to evaluate environmental risks, strategic opportuni-
ties, and policies. They have to define conducts, and commitments to stakeholders’ 
needs, and are also involved in the process of environmental reporting [179, 239]. 
On the same vein, [240–244] argue that the establishment of a CSRC enhances 
voluntary and social disclosure. CSRCs are considered as a sustainable reporting 
assurance. Furthermore, as they are supposed to promote and monitor CSR activi-
ties, their creation could serve as a positive signal to the market and other competi-
tors [238, 245].
Finally, CSRCs actions could reduce the risk of litigation and other reputational 
risks [23, 127, 244].
4 The SBF120 index consists of the largest 120 capitalizations listed on the French stock Exchange 
market (SBF: Société des Bourses Françaises).
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3.3 Diversity in CSRC does matter
The literature on heterogeneity in CSRC is not yet fully explored. Very few areas 
of diversity have been explored, such as the presence of independent members, 
gender diversity, age, and members’ affiliations.
For instance, independent members in CSRCs are prone to ensure an effec-
tive monitoring and a better management: they reduce the risk of opportunistic 
behaviors [246, 247]. Moreover, independent CSRC could significantly increase 
CSR performance [246]. In fact, they can provide more objective feedback regard-
ing firm’s operations and performance. Also, they could be more sensitive to 
stakeholder’s demands [237]. Besides, the presence of independent directors could 
contribute to the enhancement of governance features which improves significantly 
CSR performance [2].
Also, specific members could play a meaningful role in CSRC. First, the CEO 
membership in CSRC can negatively influence corporate governance by impairing 
the functions of inside directors. CSRC members who develop friendships with 
CEOs have low integrity and low monitoring abilities [248–250]. Powerful CEOs are 
likely to influence the board decision to serve their personal rather than investors’ 
interests. CEO membership could prevent companies from generating valuable 
intangible strategic assets in order to achieve competitive advantages and a high 
level of social performance [167, 251]. Second, chairpersons could be CSRC mem-
bers. They are, therefore, able to discuss CSR topics in board meetings [252].
Regarding gender diversity in CSRC, previous studies show that female directors 
are more inclined to respond to stakeholders’ expectations and could bring impor-
tant resources to committees such as information, human capital, external networks, 
skills and constituencies that increase understanding of the creativity and innova-
tion [9, 58, 253]. For instance, [2] argue that female directors are more likely to be 
sensitive to environmental issues, bring to the light critical elements of corporate 
governance and care more about human rights. Accordingly, female directors could 
encourage and require firms to adopt and adapt their strategic CSR mindsets.
Finally, regarding CSRC functioning, [254] show that the number of meetings 
organized could be considered as a proxy for directors’ monitoring effort. The 
director is likely to be more informed about existing and appropriate strategies 
and actions to solve problems as the number of meetings increases [254, 256]. 
Therefore, committees suffer less from asymmetric information [41, 254].
4. Conclusion
The current chapter analyzes the literature on the influence of diversity in 
boardrooms and CSR committees.
Board diversity could shape the decision-making process, specifically in terms 
of socially responsible activities [171]. The heterogeneity of directors’ profiles can 
increase exchanges and business’ connections, offer new perspectives, and influ-
ence the board’s functioning. Consequently, it can influence both financial and 
social performances [257, 258]. More diverse boards could drive better social perfor-
mance than less diverse ones [2, 6]. It could also promote specific CSR strategies. In 
fact, CSR literature identifies a dichotomous approach to define CSR strategies:
1. Strategic CSR is based on original and pioneering actions to foster interactions 
between the firm and stakeholders, going beyond CSR regulations and stan-
dards. It needs the mobilization of specific resources and capabilities driving 
superior social performance.
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2. Responsive CSR is an imitative CSR strategy where the firm is involved in CSR 
activities responding to specific regulations and stakeholders’ pressure. In calls 
for tenders, governments may prefer socially responsible firms.
This dichotomous approach of CSR strategies could be biased. Many firms could 
display a strategic CSR in some areas and a responsive CSR in other areas. The 
literature on how to identify them is still scarce.
We also shed light on the key role of CSR committees on CSR performance 
and the implementation of strategic CSR policies [22, 23, 25] and how they could 
decrease CSR risks [22, 23]. We notice that diversity on board committees in not yet 
fully explored, more diverse boards lead to the creation of more diverse committees 
and the emerging studies on CSRC diversity provide some empirical evidence that 
heterogeneity in CSRC is likely to favor strategic CSR.
In line with dependence resource theory, this chapter concludes that more inclu-
sive nomination policies could help the company to get access to new opportunities 
through a better understanding of the market expectations and deployment of more 
resources [9], specifically in high uncertainty contexts, where diverse teams could 
be more successful [20, 21].
© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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